Twenty-five Hours to Tragedy: The Battle of Spring Hill and Operations on November 29, 1864: Precursor to the Battle of Franklin
K**N
A fine, fine book about a series of events, that if unfolded just slightly differently, possibly could've changed how the war en
What an outstanding book! Very well researched, compiled, written, and edited. My hat is off to Mr. Gillum. Once I began to read the book, I didn't want to put it down. But, I had to. I was being wheeled into surgery to have my left hip replaced and the doctor was on his schedule, not mine. Oh well. I resumed reading as soon as I became coherent enough to find my glasses. Still, I had way too many interruptions to allow me the time needed to finish one section before anotherbnyerruption arrived, in the form of another hospital person asking me the same set of questions the previous person had asked my just 20-30 minutes earlier. What's wrong with these people!? Why don't they compare notes if they insist on asking the same questions. What could've possibly changed between now and 2 minutes ago that would necessitate me changing my initial answer and causing me to lose my place and need to re-read the previous two paragraphs? I believe it's a conspiracy to keep me from reading.Anyway, I found the book to be an excellent read and well worth anyone's time should they be even the least bit interested in our Civil War history; and, especially toward the events that led to the Battle of Franklin and Nashville, in late 1864.If I were to identify a ne thing of fault about the book,it would be that the book needs to be offered in e-book format, specifically in Kindle format as that format is the format that reaches the most readers our e-books.I've one more item, though; since I've lived in Middle Tennessee for the past 18 years myself (not being a native), and I, too, share a deep love for Civil War history, it would've been a huge help to me and others not familiar with the way this area looked during the Civil War, if some sort of over-lay of the present roads and highways could've been added to the book. In the past, nearly -5- years since the battles occurred, some of the roads and highways have been altered. The overlay would give the reader(s) an idea of actual locations of the various units as it relates to present-day roads and structures. Recently, many roads have been added to the Spring Hill area and some roads have had their names changed.I don't mean this as a negative about this book. I simply feel, from talking to people who've been in the area all of their lives, that due to modern construction and "the shifting sands of time," that an overlay of the present roads would better serve the reader. Perhaps Google Earth could be used somehow. (Hence the 4-Star rating.)
W**L
Lost Cause Exemplar
The battle or “affair” at Spring Hill in November 1864 lends itself ideally to the Lost Cause controversy: numerous “if onlys”, missed opportunities, finger pointing, in fact enough to maintain interest to the present. “Twenty-five Hours to Tragedy” presents as clear and complete a picture of what happened as it is possible to imagine 150+ years later. As well as being comprehensive about “who did what when” it is an entertaining read.With regard to the disputes and controversies of Spring Hill, the author seemed careful to avoid biasing any individual, which is a major strength of the book. Overall, it demonstrates that there were two basic command problems associated with the outcome. First, Hood ordered that the Federal forces be attacked when contacted and to sieze the Columbia-Spring Hill-Franklin pike without realizing that these two objectives could be incompatible (either-or). Second, command procedures and staff work in the Army of Tennessee was dysfunctional; for example, Hood issued orders to division commanders apparently without informing the Corps commander. As summed up by the author, “One thing is certain: every commander on the field failed in one way or another…” (p. 443).There were a couple minor quibbles. Some aspects became repetitious, perhaps in an effort at completeness, for example the apprehension of Union soldiers marching on the pike. Also, a slight Confederate bias to the narrative comes through.
J**S
A difficult read
An avid reader of historical books, this one was very hard to digest bouncing back and forth between first hand accounts and the author's narratives. Lack of timely maps (spread out, not jumbled in the middle of the book) made this even tougher. Not my first or 2nd choice for this battle
C**S
Spring Hill explained as well as it ever will be.
For years I have struggled to figure out what in the heck really happened at Spring Hill. John Bell Hood and his Army of Tennessee arrived there ahead of Schofield and his retiring army. And as a result, the “trap” that the Southerners hoped to spring never happened. Why? These were veteran Southern troops, and their commanders with few exceptions were competent, even exceptional. This book, drawing upon first hand accounts, thereby avoiding the spin and agendas of historians and academics, comes as close as we’ll ever get to piecing together the complicated, confusing events of that momentous night. The author’s incredible patience, persistence, and thoroughness in tracking down relevant primary sources is to be admired and congratulated. Oh that there were other historians willing to go to such lengths in helping to explain other battles and events of the War between the States.This is a book which I will treasure and use as a reference for years to come. If you ever purchased a book of history, and after reading it, either regretted your purchase or decided the book wasn’t worth your time or money, you will NOT have that experience with this stellar contribution to Civil War history.
W**.
Thoroughly research, suprisingly engaging
I learned several things about the "affair" at Spring Hill thanks to this book. Of special interest to me was the delay in the Confederates getting their pontoon bridge in place. The fact that the first troops (Cleburne's) attempting to cross the bridge had to actually pause and assist with its completion threw the timetable off from the beginning. Gillium shows that there is plenty of blame to be passed around for the epic command failure. Almost every officer in charge did something wrong (yes, even Cleburne and Forrest). But these mistakes were not all of equal proportion. Indeed, some of them would not have happened at all had previous mistakes not been made at higher levels of command. Still, this is a surprisingly interesting and thoroughly researched read about perhaps the biggest SNAFU of the war.
C**G
Five Stars
Go go Alabama!
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