From Gettysburg to the Rapidan: The Army of the Potomac, July, 1863, to April, 1864 Paperback – September 16, 2016

This book isn’t for everybody, but was a “find” for me personally. Humphries was on Grant’s staff and wrote volume 12 of the 16 volume Scribner’s History of the Civil War. That volume covered Grant’s Virginia Campaign of 1864-65 – the bloody battles of the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, Cold Harbor, siege of Petersburg and Lee’s surrender at Appomattox. Humphries needed had two volumes to cover so much material, so it is cut to the bone, and yet so detailed in movements, maneuvers and intentions such that professional historians find it “still useful after 150 years” as a reference.This little book consists of 137 pages that were cut from the opening of The Virginia Campaign. Here he follows the armies from Gettysburg to Fredericksburg where the 1864 Virginia campaign to end the war kicked off.Many people think vaguely of Gettysburg as the “turning point” of the war in which Lee’s army was decisively broken. Though Pickett’s division was decimated in his famous charge, the army was intact and waited a full day for the Union army to counterattack. They withdrew because, although they could live off the land in Pennsylvania, the battle left them low on ammunition which they could not replenish so deep in enemy territory.This little book covers the ten months from July 1863 to May 1864 in which Lee’s army withdrew across the Potomac into the Shenandoah valley, and then sparred actively with the Union in roughly the area from Fredericksburg to Bull Run and Centreville. Lee was by this time outnumbered 2-1, and deteriorating southern railroads had difficulty supplying him with food that lay abundant in southern warehouses. The Western theatre had collapsed, and Sherman began his drive from Chattanooga to Atlanta in the spring of 1864 simultaneously with Grant’s Virginia campaign. Lee was basically buying time for something else to happen. And he did so brilliantly.Of special interest here is A.A. Humphreys' defense of Meade against the popular belief he allowed Lee to "escape" after Gettysburg. Pursuing Lee's army through the Fairfield and Cashtown gaps would have been difficult, as the narrowness of the passes favors the defense. Though the rain swollen Potomac prevented Lee from crossing into the Shenandoah for several days, he entrenched heavily on a narrow front that was well anchored and could not be flanked . Humphreys was on Grant's staff from the start of the Wilderness Campaign to the end of the war and understands such entrenchments well. If Meade had assaulted as Lincoln and others urged, Humphreys believes the result would have been as futile and bloody as Cold Harbor.Consequently, there were no decisive battles fought in these 10 months between Gettysburg and the Virginia campaign, which is why most histories skip it. I was always curious about that empty space, so I snatched this up. I don’t recommend it unless you have similar interest. Oh, and you will need maps, which you can google online.

There are remarkably few indications of the re-publisher on this volume. Save for the new binding, glossy cover, and crisp pages, a researcher would not realize this was a reprint of a 100+ year old book. Written by the Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac (promoted right after Gettysburg), Andrew Humphreys details the movements of the AoP from Gettysburg to the line above the Rapidan (so from July 1863 through March/April of 1864). This is a must have for anyone interested in what happened between Gettysburg and the Wilderness in the eastern theater and the reproduction is very good - there is no editing. Not a narrative, in any regard, but a very important and detailed reference work.